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The Seedlings for the Forest
Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth. By Raoul Berger. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974. Pp. xvi, 430. $14.95.
Reviewed by Ralph K. Winter, Jr.t
I
Were the author of Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth an
academic obscurity tilling the fields of legal history, a reviewer might
well resolve the conflict between magnanimity and candor in favor of
the former. But Raoul Berger is a public figure, extolled in the media
as an eminent authority and relied upon as the definitive scholar on
questions of compelling public concern. What he writes is front page
news in the New York Times,' the subject of long stories in weekly
newsmagazines 2 and recommended by reviewers as important reading.3
This reader dissents. Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth
is so inadequate as to be almost beside the point.
Indeed, media praise raises serious questions about how the media
choose the legal scholarship they spotlight. Only a lack of acquaintance
with Berger's work or a hypocritical affinity for the immediate political
implications of his conclusions can explain this enthusiasm from such
unlikely sources. This is a book, for example, which strongly suggests
that President Eisenhower committed an impeachable offense when
he directed a Deputy General Counsel of the Defense Department not
to answer Senator Joseph McCarthy's questions as to conversations
within the executive branch relating to ways in which the McCarthy
investigations into the Army might be stopped. 4 Berger's principal
mode of analysis is far more compatible with the constitutional ap-
proach of those who would have impeached Earl Warren than with
that of those who would impeach Richard Nixon. For Berger the sole
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
2. NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1974, at 74; TIME, May 27, 1974, at 12, 15.
3. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1974, § 7 (Book Review), at 1.
4. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 235 (1974) [herein-
after cited to page number only].
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source of constitutional law is found in the specific expectations (in
the narrowest possible sense) of the Framers of the provisions in ques-
tion, expectations presumed to have existed in detail and discoverable
through inferences drawn from obscure events of the past. Once dis-
covered, moreover, these expectations become immutable rules of law,
not to be modified by future generations no matter how unwise or
unworkable they may seem in light of subsequent developments. 5
Berger's treatment of the Constitution suggests that it resembles more
a poorly drafted debenture bond than an enduring charter of govern-
ment.
Shades of the John Birch Society, for that kind of cramped view of
constitutional law has been the wellspring of so much of the more irre-
sponsible rightwing criticism of modern decisions of the Supreme
Court. If, indeed, Berger represents the length and breadth of our
legitimate legal culture, then grave doubt is cast upon such decisions
as Brown v. Board of Education" and New York Times v. Sullivan,
while unequivocal condemnation must be the lot of Reynolds v. Sims,8
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,9 Shapiro v. Thompson,'0 Roe
v. Wade, l Furman v. Georgia, 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 3 Mapp v.
Ohio,1 4 to mention only a few. And whatever happened to the Tenth
Amendment?
My disagreement with Berger is not over whether the intent of the
Framers of a constitutional provision is relevant and thus a constraint
upon those who would construe the Constitution. More than most I
think it is. But the discovery of constitutional intent is a multidimen-
sional task with differing consequences for the shape of the law where
differing variables exist. The development of governmental institu-
tions, the experience gained through years of adjudication, and the
growth of competing principles may all throw differing lights on con-
stitutional intent and legitimately call for varying constitutional re-
sults. Of this more later,'0 for it suffices here to point out that the
principal analytic mode Berger employs is so narrow as to be of very
limited usefulness.
5. Pp. 10-12.
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
9. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
10. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
11. 410 U.S. 113, rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
13. 384 U.S. 436 (J966).
14. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. See pp. 1734-36 infra.
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Executive Privilege also suffers from serious analytic confusion.
Berger treats the question of whether Congress may inquire into the
conduct of the affairs of the executive branch, for instance, as being
virtually the same as whether a valid concept of executive privilege
exists.1' But the power to inquire and the right to invoke a privilege
can easily coexist in a legal system. Indeed, they do in countless situa-
tions, for a privilege generally limits only the sources from which evi-
dence may be taken rather than the subject matter which may be legit-
imately investigated. One's barber after all can testify to the very con-
versations one's attorney must keep confidential.
Berger also embarks on long tangents about presidential power to
conduct foreign affairs' 7 or make war' s which really add little one way
or the other. To be sure, executive privilege cannot attach where the
presidency has no substantive powers. But to attempt to dispose of the
executive privilege question by that route also strongly suggests that
where powers exist, so does the privilege.
Beyond that, Berger often fails to distinguish between the very dif-
ferent concepts of absolute privilege and qualified privilege. While
the tone and the title of the work seem to reject any form of privilege
root and branch, much of the argumentation is directed only at claims
of absolute privilege.' For instance-and most important-Berger's
discussion of Chief Justice Marshall's statements in United States v.
Burr" notes that they are inconsistent with the position that the Presi-
dent alone can determine whether or not documents relevant to litiga-
tion can be suppressed. But he does not go on to explore the implica-
tions of Marshall's statement that a presidential claim of confidential-
ity is to be weighed against the essentiality of the evidence to the case 2'
in which the great Chief Justice seemed very much to recognize a
limited form of executive privilege.
There is a world of difference between denying any privilege and
holding that a privilege exists which may be overcome in specified
circumstances. Every judge who ruled on Watergate Special Prosecu-
tor Cox's pursuit of presidential tapes rejected the notion that execu-
tive privilege is a "constitutional myth," with the majority concluding
16. E.g., pp. 15-48, 182.
17. Pp. 117-62.
18. Pp. 60-116.
19. E.g., pp. 190-91, 358-61. As a result, Berger's views on the ruling of the court
of appeals as to Special Prosecutor Cox's pursuit of the tapes are ambiguous. Pp.
350-52. This problem is to some extent a function of Berger's style. See p. 1734 infra.
20. 25 F. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
21. Pp. 190-91. Berger in fact recognizes that Marshall held that only a "pressing
need" could overcome presidential claims of confidentiality. Id. at 357, 360, 361.
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that a qualified privilege exists. 22 Because Berger fails to address the
question of whether the competing demands of privacy and need for
information can be accommodated by the kind of rule these judges
followed, his book is almost a nondiscussion of the problem.
This failure cannot be excused, moreover, by resort to "history," for
his own catalogue of events fairly screams at the reader that only a
laboriously tortured reading of the past supports the conclusion that
executive privilege is a "constitutional myth." For example, George
Washington and his cabinet-including Thomas Jefferson, Alexander
Hamilton, Edmund Randolph-concluded that the President has dis-
cretion to refuse papers to Congress "the disclosure of which would
injure the public."23 James Madison, when a member of the House
of Representatives, argued flatly that the President had such power.2 4
And, in Marbury v. Madison25 and United States v. Burr,2  Marshall
indicated that at least a limited right to resist disclosure existed in the
executive branch.
Sure, one can bob and weave and split hairs over each of these in-
stances. In the event, Washington gave up the papers .2 7 The "prepon-
derance of sentiment in the House . . . ran counter to Madison."28
Marshall's remarks in Marbury are dicta and involved civil litigation
rather than a congressional request to boot.2 9 And, in Burr, Marshall
declined to recognize the privilege as absolute.30 But by arguing that
it is a "constitutional myth" on these grounds, Berger mistakes, not
the trees, but the seedlings, for the forest.
Men such as these, familiar with the circumstances surrounding the
framing and ratification of the Constitution and skilled in political
and judicial statecraft, could not conceivably have said what they did
if in fact the specific intent of the Founding Fathers was to deny any
form of executive privilege. Indeed, they were leading members of
that group and it flies in the face of common sense to write off their
words and actions as inconsequential. To be sure, one cannot glean
from their words, as William Rogers has, an absolute privilege,31 but
22. In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C.) (Sirica, C.J.), affd, 487
F.2d 700, 713-17 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); id. at 730 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in
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only a strong will to reach a predetermined result can explain Berger's
wholesale rejection of their testimony.
Where the established past fails to fit snugly into the mold Berger
has assigned to it, it is simply discarded as wrong. The famous and the
mighty are not spared in this quest for a more perfect past, for Berger
does not hesitate to label Washington "plainly wrong"'32 in withhold-
ing from the House of Representatives, information on the Jay Treaty
and to chide Jefferson, after "respectful consideration," for holding
views on executive privilege which Berger claims are based on a mis-
reading of an English precedent. 33
Despite his assertion that executive privilege is a "myth," Berger
proves at best (from his standpoint) that the Framers left the question
of executive privilege to the future. At worst he demonstrates that the
constitutional structure they created was such as to generate very
strong pressures for such a privilege.
One cause of Berger's analytic failures can be traced to style. The
tone of his work is self-important and petulant. The chapter in which
he tosses off statements by Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Mar-
shall as irrelevant thus ends with the argument that Berger's views are
confirmed because a statement of those views was sent to William
Rogers several years ago and returned without comment. 34 At times
it seems the subject of the book is not the general question of execu-
tive privilege but a series of articles, briefs or memos which take posi-
tions contrary to his own.35 In particular he attacks a memorandum
submitted by Rogers to Congress when he was President Eisenhower's
Attorney General.3 6 Because that memo takes an absolutist position,
it is more than a little vulnerable, but Berger too often seems to think
that refuting it is the same as defending his own extreme position. In
discussing Marshall's statements in Burr, for example, Berger's urge
to show that the Rogers' paper can find no support in that source seems
to obscure from him the fact that his own position is equally under-
mined. So much of Berger's argumentation is directed at defeating the
straw men he sees around him that the need to establish his own case




35. Among his targets are: Bishop, The Executive's Right to Privacy: An Unresolved
Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Con.
gressional.Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of Na-
tional Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 585 (1945); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War
Powers Act, 50 TEXAs L. REV. 833 (1972).
36. Pp. 163-208.
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II
A discussion of an issue such as executive privilege must begin with
an exposure of the particular writer's view of the legitimate sources
of constitutional law. I willingly stand with-Berger in rejecting as the
principal source of constitutional law the idiosyncratic views of those
who happen to be in power at a particular time. Indeed, one major
difference between constitutional and nonconstitutional rules is that
the former create and define political power and are themselves sub-
ject to it only when certain requirements are met, such as an amending
procedure. In general, then, constitutional language, structure and
history ought to be the main sources of constitutional law.
Constitutional interpretation, however, is more than the assembly
of historical minutiae from which inferences of intent may be drawn-
or, in Berger's case, wrenched. We must keep in mind that there are
several levels of legislative intent relevant to any examination of a con-
stitutional provision. There are, of course, the specific, immediate ex-
pectations of the Drafters as to the legal effect the provision would
have on the existing laws and practices of the day. A search for this
entails examination of the usual data of legislative history: the his-
torical circumstances in which the provision was drafted, the rhetoric
which accompanied it, the substitutes or amendments which were
rejected, past practices, and the specific issues (gleaned from state-
ments of sponsors and so on) it was thought to resolve one way or the
other.
In examining such material, one must be careful not to assume that
a specific intent or expectation in fact existed. Berger indulges in a
strong presumption against finding that the Framers left the resolu-
tion of an issue to the future,37 and that-as well as his strong personal
distaste for executive privilege-leads. to his cavalier treatment of the
views of so many of our nation's early leaders. 38
It can be the case, moreover, that even the presence of a specific
expectation on the Framers' part is not conclusive, if legislative intent
in a broader and more fundamental sense is to be given effect. Con-
stitutional language is usually more general than is warranted by the
specific expectations of the Framers and it has thus long been thought
that the boundaries of legitimate interpretation extend beyond those
immediate expectations.
The American Constitution is more than a text of "do's" and
37. See, e.g., pp. 10-13.
38. See p. 1754 supra.
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"don't's." It established a government composed of a variety of insti-
tutions and, as Charles L. Black, Jr., has eloquently expounded, one
can legitimately find constitutional law in inferences drawn from
"structure and relation." 39 As Black has argued, for example, the con-
stitutional implications of federalism may well lead to legal conclu-
sions which are quite valid but which find little support in the text
itself.40 Such inferences, moreover, may touch on matters more funda-
mental than those which have found precise exposition in the text.
The establishment of separation between the branches and the adop-
tion of a representative form of government, for instance, have impli-
cations for the question of executive privilege.
A written constitution with difficult amendment procedures strongly
encourages the body politic to add to the document only general
declarations on matters of great import, leaving room for growth and
change in the light of history and the perspective afforded by a delib-
erate elaboration as experience grows. General language may thus be
taken as a signal that broad principles or theories of government
transcending immediate political goals are involved, and this illustrates
yet another sense in which we may properly speak of legislative intent.
Brown v. Board of Education4 1 is a legitimate gloss on the Fourteenth
Amendment, but not because its authors anticipated that "separate
but equal" would be invalidated by its ratification. Quite the contrary,
the preponderance of evidence tends to suggest the opposite.42 But it
is legitimate, nevertheless, because experience plainly demonstrated
what was not clear at the time of passage: "separate but equal" is in-
consistent with the main purpose of the Amendment, the relief of legal
obstacles based on race alone.
Intent in this broader sense can be determined only by resort to im-
plications drawn in light of a variety of factors including the Framers'
expectations, the nature of our constitutional structure, and our ex-
perience with it. To be sure, this is a difficult task, for many elements
will not accommodate each other easily and will look in inconsistent
directions. Nevertheless, one must seek to reconcile the discordant ele-
ments and, where total harmony seems impossible, those who would
give meaning to the Constitution must look to its core purposes and
effectuate them, even at the cost of abandoning an irreconcilable
fringe.
39. C. BLACK, STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
40. Id. at 11-32.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAtv. L.
REv. 1, 58 (1955).
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III
Berger's framework of analysis is thus wholly inadequate. Indeed,
even within that framework his argument is unconvincing. It is demon-
strably the case-indeed, Berger has strengthened my own convictions
on this score-that there was in no sense a final resolution by the
Framers of the question of executive privilege43 and that general prin-
ciples of governance and the structure of our political institutions must
provide the answer.44
The very idea of separation of powers-and the concomitant rejec-
tion of a parliamentary system, a rejection which Berger carefully un-
derplays45-implies that no one branch can dominate another except
in a transient political sense and that each branch is entitled to ar-
range its own affairs so as to permit it to carry out and protect its func-
tions and responsibilities efficiently. It implies, in short, that no
branch be crippled and that they are to interact out of mutual strength,
not mutual weakness. This goal thus requires an accommodation of
competing constitutional values, for at some point the need for privacy
and the need for information will conflict.
Although others have reached similar conclusions based on the
Speech or Debate Clause,40 I have no doubt that legislators have a form
of privilege attached to, say, conversations with their aides relating to
official business, a privilege in my view better derived from constitu-
tional structure and relationship than the specific constitutional pro-
vision. A similar privilege would, I think, attach to conferences among
Justices of the Supreme Court and conversations between them and
their law clerks, again so long as official business is involved.
For quite similar reasons-not to say for the sake of plain common
sense-an analogous privilege ought to be recognized in the Executive.
Indeed, the long history of de facto recognition alone might com-
mand the result even were there not other good reasons for doing so. 4 7
To begin with, the argument that denial of a privilege will greatly
increase the information available to the public in the long run is
overdrawn. Law can only do so much to offset the politician's thirst
for confidentiality, since government officials can adjust their affairs
so as to decrease the flow of information. Berger makes much of what
43. See p. 1783 supra.
44. See pp. 1734-36 supra.
45. E.g., pp. 10, 11.
46. Cf. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
47. The remainder of this review draws on R. WINTER, WATERGATE AND THE LAW:
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS AND PRESID NTIAL PowER 53-62 (1974) [hereinafter cited as WINTER].
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could have been learned from the Pentagon Papers, 48 but if publica-
tion is anticipated, such studies will not be made.
The fear of constant exposure may thus shape the decisionmaking
process in a way that is against the better judgment of those respon-
sible for it. This may in turn reduce the quality of decisions. Internal
debate may also be adversely affected, for advocacy of new or contro-
versial points of view may be chilled. Additionally, the already exces-
sive pressure to eliminate officials whose views differ from the ac-
cepted orthodoxy will be increased by the fears that division within
the administration cannot be confined. Finally, the ability to com-
promise will be reduced since delicate negotiations are not possible
if confidentiality is impossible. This was demonstrated by the Found-
ing Fathers when they met in secrecy to write the Constitution, and
few have since doubted both the wisdom and absolute necessity of that
decision.
Those who clamor for total exposure simply do not like representa-
tive government. Under that structure, governmental officials are not
robots responding to every momentary shift of opinion among their
constituents. Representatives are expected to exercise independent
judgment and to defend their decisions at periodic elections. This calls
for them to lead rather than follow and implies that they may estab-
lish whatever decisional processes they believe appropriate. These
processes themselves, of course, must be defended to the people.
Beyond efficiency and rationality, however, is the question" of the
independence of the executive branch. The ability to compel the
divulgence of confidential conversations is power that can be used for
indiscriminate purposes. Want a new dam in your district? Subpoena
the President's appointments calendar. Want some pet legislation
passed? Subpoena the President's diary. Overdrawn to be sure, but the
unrestrained legal power to probe at will into the affairs of the execu-
tive branch can severely weaken the executive branch and perhaps
subordinate it to Congress. Some form of executive privilege may be
essential to the independence of the Executive.
The disclosure of the Nixon transcripts, I believe, illustrates the
danger of divulging confidential conversations. A large part of the
ensuing negative reaction was generated by material which was ger-
mane to neither impeachment nor criminal proceedings. Newspapers
which had demanded release of the tapes to aid those proceedings40
48. P. 284.
49. See, e.g., Pattern of Deception, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1974, at 30, col. 1.
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hesitated not at all to print stories about vulgar presidential language,
how political considerations dominated presidential discussions, how
his staff interrupted him, his indecisiveness in conversation, and so
onO-though the conversations of any President are unlikely to match
the public image the White House puts forth. Politicians whose own
connections with the administration belied their expressions of sur-
prise at the nature of presidential conversations proceeded to de-
nounce the President5 while his political enemies had a field day.
Thus disclosure of material unrelated to but intertwined with matters
of substantive importance may inflict crippling political damage.
Beyond that, inquiry into many matters that ought to be covered by
a privilege will put subordinate officials in an exceedingly difficult
position. For example, wholesale inquiry into internal conversations
of the Executive will call for testimony by such officials which is coun-
ter to every political instinct and pressure imaginable. Some may be
forced either to leave government or to perjure themselves; we ought
not arrange our affairs so that those most apt to commit perjury are
best qualified for survival in government service.
One cannot, however, move from this line of reasoning to the con-
clusion reached by the Rogers memorandum: that any matter the
President believes cannot be published without damage to the national
interest is privileged.5 2 Because the privilege is derived by implication
from the structure of our government and the nature of the presiden-
tial office, it covers only matters fairly related to the exercise of the
legitimate functions and powers of that office, not everything encom-
passed within a particular President's idiosyncratic view of the national
interest.
IV
Because Berger assumes there is an ascertainable, optimal degree of
secrecy, he is eager for legal rules governing congressional access to in-
formation in the executive branch. My quarrel with him is not so
much over whether we need more or less secrecy as over whether a
feasible general rule is in fact either attainable or wise. If the courts,
for example, were to spell out that the President possessed an extremely
broad executive privilege, Presidents might invoke it more frequently
since the political cost of doing so would be less once the law "legiti-
mated" it. Similarly, if the courts were to give Congress easy access to
50. See, e.g., id., May 1, 1974, at 1, col. 4; Cover up 1I, id., May 3, 1974, at 38, col. 1.
51. Cf. id., May 4, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
52. Pp. 163-66.
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materials in the Executive Branch, demands for information might be
more frequent with the consequent inevitable abuses.
The difficulty is that in any particular case no ascertainable legal
weight can be given either to CongTess' "need" to know or the "need"
for executive privacy. This is because the legal principles are of only
partial relevance to the actual dispute. For example, congressional de-
mands for information usually result as much from a desire to make
political gains through exposure as from a concern that legislation
rest on adequate data. The Senate Select Watergate Committee, for
instance, was formally established to pursue certain "legislative" goals.
Although these goals would seem attainable only by an investigation
of several presidential elections, the Senate, on a party line vote, re-
stricted the Committee's jurisdiction to the 1972 campaign. Similarly,
presidential resistance may often be generated as much by a fear of
adverse public opinion or misunderstanding as by a desire to protect
the quality of executive decisionmaking.
Most such cases have political concerns at their core, with one side
seeking political advantage from disclosure while the other resists or
seeks to control disclosure so that its actions appear in the best light.
No one familiar with the workings of the Congress doubts that the
very decision to hold hearings is essentially political, as is the presi-
dential decision to invoke executive privilege. 53
A general rule of law, however, must ignore these factors and focus
on weighing the "legal" considerations: legislative purpose versus pro-
tection of the executive decisionmaking process. Because the political
aspects simply cannot be weighed by the judicial method, they are lost
in the process and will be recognized only randomly and accidentally.
But the political aspects are of critical importance and just as legiti-
mate as the "legal." If we are to have a sensible political process, ex-
posure for exposure's sake and the executive's political resistance to it
must both have a place in the system.
For this reason, I think political accommodation is the best way to
resolve conflicts between Congress' "need" to know and the President's
"need" for confidentiality. It tests the asserted needs by letting the
public decide how much secrecy we ought to have, the way the public
decides other matters of import in a democratic society. "How much
secrecy?" is the people's business and we should not discourage their
attention to that business by acting as though a final and infallible
decision is available in the courts.
53. R. WNINa.R, supra note 47, at 59.
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Berger is able to write off political considerations because he views
the Constitution as one might view an escrow agreement, that is, as a
document which fully describes the institutions and powers it creates.
His view of the presidency, drawn entirely from the bare words of
Article II and pre-Convention "history," is so arid and constricted that
one wonders why anyone would bother to have elections to choose who
would serve in such a mechanical and powerless post. This analytic
framework does not permit one to view Congress and the presidency
in their political as well as legal dimensions and his work thus dis-
plays a lack of any sense of the political process. His work is unidimen-
sional and chooses the least relevant dimension at that. For that rea-
son, there is an air of unreality about it.
V
The political question doctrine has not been favored as of late by the
Supreme Court.54 Nevertheless, because of the political factors men-
tioned above, I think that congressional subpoenas in the area of
executive privilege are a paradigm case of the doctrine's continued
usefulness, for the usual congressional probe raises issues which cannot
be well resolved by the judicial process. Such considerations should
not be disregarded, as they are when a court weighs the "legal" claims
of legislative purpose and the need for confidentiality. These contro-
versies, therefore, raise a classic nonjusticiable issue and should be so
treated by the courts: a legal victory for the Executive, but on grounds
which take no position on the claim of executive privilege.
This gives little legal power to Congress, but it has considerable
political power to obtain information. Congress need not pass legisla-
tion without access to relevant information, it can refuse to confirm
appointments when data are withheld, and it can provide for the auto-
matic suspension of programs if information about their operation is
not turned over to Congress. Finally, if strongly desired information is
withheld, Congress may openly retaliate by cutting off funds for
presidential staff.
So long as the courts do not decide the merits of the executive privi-
lege questions and hold that such disputes are nonjusticiable, such
retaliation would not be open to the constitutional challenge that it
violates the separation of powers, as was claimed by President Eisen-
hower in the case of a congressional cutoff of foreign aid funds to
54. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-49 (1969).
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Peru.53 "The Congress is thus not impotent when it comes to enforcing
its wishes against claims of executive privilege, and political accommo-
dation is a viable means of resolving such a conflict."' 6 A President
who withholds relevant information may also suffer great political
'damage, as President Nixon's troubles show. Indeed, post-Watergate
Presidents will likely hesitate to invoke a privilege which has gotten
such a bad name in recent times. Congress' power in this regard will
ultimately depend upon its ability to mobilize public opinion behind its
demands, and the public will get the amount of secrecy that it regards
as proper.
Congress frequently wants information from the Executive which it
might gather itself. While Berger regards a duplication of effort as a
"costly folly,"' 7 one may well ask whether Congress ought to be so
reliant on the Executive for information. That reliance may imperil
legislative fact finding far more than any explicit claim of executive
privilege.
In some cases, however, a very specific congressional need for infor-
mation exists, and judicial enforcement of subpoenas might seem
proper to some. The paradigm case would seem to be impeachment
proceedings in which specific information relating to the commission
of impeachable offenses is sought. "Here the legislative need may seem
easier to weigh (though political considerations abound) because the
investigation has quite precise goals established for it.""s
Still, enforcement would involve the judiciary in imponderable
judgments so similar to-or perhaps more intractable than-those de-
scribed above that one may well question the appropriateness of judi-
cial intervention. If the garden variety congressional subpoena is
unenforceable, for example, the enforcing court in the case of im-
peachment must determine that the impeachment inquiry is genuine
and not simply a device to avoid the general rule. The court must
determine, in short, that the House has not adopted the impeachment
label solely to achieve access to judicial power.
Beyond that, a court enforcing a subpoena must make a determina-
tion of relevance, and that in turn calls for a decision on whether the
matters under inquiry involve impeachable offenses. If, as Berger has
asserted elsewhere, 50 the impeachment process is ultimately subject
to judicial review-a conclusion I regard as textually and institutionally
55. P. 288.
56. R. WINTER, supra note 47, at 60.
57. P. 3.
58. R. WINTER, supra note 47, at 60.
59. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-21 (1973).
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senseless-that is not a problem. But if impeachment is exclusively a
congressional function, then the question of what is an impeachable
offense is one to be avoided by courts at all stages. If, for example, a
court were to enforce (or not enforce) a subpoena after deciding cer-
tain conduct constituted (or did not constitute) an impeachable of-
fense, that would inevitably have a profound effect on the exercise
of congressional responsibility. Although it would not legally bind
either House or Senate to a particular definition of impeachable of-
fenses, politically it would have virtually the same effect. The
determination of whether an impeachable offense has occurred is a
question of fact, law and politics in the highest sense, and the institu-
tions entrusted with the power to make it must accept full responsi-
bility for their decision without being either permitted or compelled
to share it with an institution whose relation to that decision is wholly
incidental. On balance therefore, I think courts ought to decline to
intervene in impeachment subpoenas.
To be sure, this then raises the specter of Congress impeaching and
convicting for failure to respond to its subpoenas, and that is not a
welcome prospect. Still, there are areas of possible accommodation and
compromise between the President and Congress which may lessen the
cataclysmic nature of the conflict. And that conflict itself, while unde-
sirable, may be preferable to the consequences of judicial involvement.
VI
Where subpoenas are issued in the course of criminal litigation or
investigations, different considerations apply. The reasons for denying
enforcement of congressional writs lie in the political nature of the
conflict and the existence of alternative means of access. Where crim-
inal proceedings are at stake, the political motivation of those seeking
evidence may be less and the "legal" issues-need, relevance, a claim
of confidentiality-are more easily weighed. There is, moreover, a real
question as to whether confidence in our system of government and in
the integrity of the presidency will not be sapped by a rule which,
however well intentioned, appears to put the Chief Executive beyond
the law. If persons thought to have committed criminal acts are
shielded by such a privilege, a crisis of confidence in government can
ensue. The very reason for having a privilege-protecting the institu-
tion of the presidency-may well thus call for limits on it and an abso-
lute privilege may be counterproductive. Courts should, therefore,
recognize the privilege as qualified or limited.
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The privilege should nevertheless provide a wide umbrella of pro-
tection, to be overcome only by a strong showing of need. Prosecutors
can, after all, be politically motivated, and the United States Code
provides ample opportunity to make claims of probable cause. The
showing of need should, therefore, be quite specific and the court
should not compel disclosure unless satisfied that a genuine criminal
investigation is involved.
The court should review the evidence in camera to determine
whether the need for disclosure outweighs whatever harm it may do,
to excise intermingled and irrelevant material, and to delete superflu-
ous or embarrassing phrases and the like. By and large the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the "tapes" case0 °
is adequate and a good example of this procedure.
VII
The most important lesson to be learned from Executive Privilege
may lie in the wide exposure given it by the media. Berger's work on
impeachment suffered from many of the same inadequacies and it too
was widely publicized. Impeachment, however, was an otherwise ob-
scure subject, and Berger was the only game in town. This is not the
case with executive privilege, though, for that issue has spawned an
extensive literature which easily surpasses Berger's work in quality. In-
deed, most of Berger's material which bears directly on the issue was
published years ago6 ' and was received at that time by the media and
the profession with an understandable indifference.
One is tempted, therefore, to say that such a cramped, unidimen-
sional view of constitutional law commands attention only because
the conclusions it reaches have immediate political implications favored
by those who are publicizing it. Since the implications drawn from
Berger deserve a better legal foundation, and indeed have gotten it,02
one should better conclude that the media's view of legal scholarship
is simply ill-informed and indiscriminate.
60. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
61. Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1044
(1965).
62. Bickel, Wretched Tapes (Cont.), N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1973, at 37, col. 7.
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